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Abstract:
This  paper  studies  how groups  resolve  disagreement  when they  must  reach  unanimity  after 
submitting individual proposals and exchanging text-form messages via a chat window in lottery 
choice experiments. We find that the majority proposal does not always prevail. The minority 
proposal prevails sometimes, especially when it is closer to risk neutrality. About one third of the 
groups disagrees after communication and would have got zero payoffs if disagreement remains 
after two more attempts without communication. In these groups, extrovert subjects  are more 
likely to lead the group outcome than confused or conscientious subjects. Overall group choices 
are  more  coherent  and  closer  to  risk  neutrality  than  individuals’.  Checking  the  recorded 
messages, we find that the chat activity is intense, growing with the level of disagreement and 
aims at finding consensus. The amount and timing of chat messages help  us  to predict which 
choice prevails in the group.
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1 Introduction
In  an experiment  we  study decision-making  procedures  of  individuals  versus  groups 
when facing  lottery  choices.  Eliciting  risk  attitudes  for  groups  was  initiated  in  management 
(Stoner, 1961; Pruitt, 1971; Lamm and Myers, 1978) and recently involved also economists (i.e. 
Shupp and Williams, 2008, Baker et al., 2008). When a group decides whether to enter a lottery 
or  not,  there  is  no  obvious  correct  choice  and  individuals  may  legitimately  differ  in  their 
proposals  due to their preferences. For this reason the psychological literature on groups and 
teams would classify this  task as “judgmental”.1 On the contrary,  “intellective” tasks have a 
demonstrably correct  solution. Examples are beauty contest games (Kocher and Sutter, 2005) 
and common value auctions (Cox and Hayne, 2006). The only intellective aspect of our lottery 
task is that choices should be coherent or monotonic.
Existing experimental studies on lottery choices made by groups have two main interests: 
detecting “risky shifts” and examining the improvement  in the coherency of choices.  Earlier 
studies  from the  management  literature  introduced  the  concepts  of  risky shifts  and cautious 
shifts. “Risky shift” denotes situations where groups make riskier decisions than individuals, and 
“cautious shift” otherwise.
   This study has a novel design and a different focus in comparison with existing studies. 
Our aim is to understand in greater detail how groups deal with disagreement. We keep a record 
of group communication and use it in data analysis; we also adopt a strong unanimity rule to 
create common interest within group members, which has not been employed in other studies. 
Through the group process, we find that lottery choices become more coherent and closer 
to risk neutrality. In resolving disagreement the majority proposal quite often prevails, although 
there are some interesting personality and demographic effects, which we report in detail below.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature. Section 
3  describes  experimental  design  and  procedures.  Section  4  reports  the  results.  Section  5 
concludes.
2 Literature Review 
This section focuses on four recent papers that examine decisions made by groups facing 
risky choices, Harrison et al. (2005) Shupp and Williams (2008), Baker et al. (2008), Masclet et 
al. (2009). Table 1 presents a design comparison with the present study. All studies, including 
ours, compare lottery choices of groups of three members with individuals choosing in isolation. 
1 Other judgmental tasks are ultimatum and trust games, which involve social preferences (Bornstein and Yariv, 
1998, Cason and Mui, 1997).
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In both treatments subjects face the same set of lottery choices (8, 9, 10, or 15) and identical 
monetary incentives. At the end of the session, only one of the lotteries is randomly selected for 
payment. 
Shupp and Williams (2008), Baker et al. (2008), Masclet et al. (2009) all find that groups 
are more risk averse than individuals. On the contrary, Harrison et al. (2005) report no group 
effect. This might be due to the different rule Harrison et al. (2005) implement to determine the 
group decision. Instead of using a unanimous rule, each group voted for the lottery they preferred 
under a majority voting rule in Harrison et al. (2005). As Baker et. al. (2008) note, the unanimity 
rule is more likely to induce more pressure toward uniformity in groups than the majority rule.
   Among existing studies of group risk attitude, the present paper is novel in at least three 
important  aspects.  First,  a  written  record  of  the  communication  among  group  members is 
obtained. As a result,  we can analyze communication to understand internal dynamics  of the 
group and to explain differences in outcomes. Second, before group members communicate and 
then make their anonymous choices privately, we elicit individual proposals and posted them for 
the group to see. Third, we employ a novel rule to deal with disagreement.
  Existing studies exhibit a significant diversity in design along a number of dimensions 
(Table  1).  The  most  interesting  differences  in  the  studies  pertain  to group interaction.  First, 
Masclet  et  al.  (2009)  randomly change group composition  for  each  lottery choice  while  the 
others keep it fixed. This generates different dynamic incentives to “tune-in” with the group. 
Second, communication ranges from none, to anonymous chat rooms, to face-to-face interaction. 
We know from experiments on social dilemmas that communication can have profound effects 
on  choices.2 With  lottery  choices,  the  issue  is  not  much  free  riding  but  rather  preference 
aggregation. The role of communication is then more to exchange information about intended 
choices and eventually to reach an agreement, given that the instructions in all studies call for a 
unanimous  group decision.  Different  communication  protocols  offer  specific  technologies  to 
exchange  information.  A  face-to-face  communication  presents  opportunities  for  strong 
personalities  to  dominate  group  discussion  and  for  biases  due  to  appearance  or  other 
“distractions.” It also lowers anonymity because people can recognize friends or talk with group 
members after the experiment. On the contrary, chat communication offers more equal access to 
the discussion floor and high levels of anonymity. Another dimension of communication is the 
2 It  has  been  documented  in  the  experimental  literature  that  pre-play  face-to-face  communication significantly 
improves cooperation in public  good game (for  instance Isaac  and Walker,  1988; Cason and Khan,  1999) and 
common-pool resource experiments under conditions of heterogeneity in resource endowment and payoffs (Hackett 
et al., 1994). 
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degree to which it is structured. In our study there was a compulsory pre-communication stage 
where subjects wrote their proposed choice for everyone to see. 
   Although often downplayed in experiments with groups, the default choice when a group 
does  not  reach  unanimity  is  theoretically  extremely  important.  Each of  the  studies  adopts  a 
different  criterion  to  resolve  disagreement:  random  choice,  majority  rule,  mean  choice,  no 
choice. The “no choice” default is often employed also in the field, where a group does not take a 
stand nor bid in an auction unless agreement is reached. We now discuss the implicit incentives 
that different default rules generate for group discussion. Let us adopt the standard assumption 
that subjects have well-defined preferences toward risk and assume that they are informed about 
the intended choices of others in their group. The last column of Table 1 lists whether a subject 
would benefit from successfully persuading others to change their intended choice (“talk”). It 
may be that all three group members have different opinions or that there is a majority of two 
versus a minority of one. All default rules exhibit positive incentives to talk, except majority 
rule, where if you are already part of the majority you do not have any incentive to persuade 
others.  Another crucial  aspect is the incentives to “listen,” given that  you have well-defined 
preferences. No default rule has positive incentives to listen except the one in our study. In that 
case if the group reaches no unanimous decision, no decision is placed, so earnings are zero for 
everyone  in the group.  Such  a  default  rule  sets  the highest  incentives  both to  “talk”  and to 
“listen”  to  other  group  members.  Of  course,  there  may  be  other  types  of  advantages  from 
listening  to  others  besides  those  considered  in  Table  1.  Communication  may  enhance  the 
understanding of the task as well as learning about the intended choices of others and so benefit 
everyone in the group. Table 1 considers incentives under the more narrow view of rational 
subjects endowed with precise utility functions, which are common knowledge.
Some experiments employ a within-subject design and others a between-subject design. 
The former allows a more direct comparison of choices in isolation (I) and in group (G) but may 
exhibit order effects. To control for order effects, Masclet et al. (2009) run sessions with I-G and 
G-I sequences and do not find any. A between-subject design relies instead on an assumption of 
similar preferences of the two experimental samples for I and for G treatments.
Other  experimental  studies  have  groups  facing  more  challenging  choices  under  risk. 
Rockenbach  et  al.  (2007)  compare  individuals  and  groups  with  respect  to  choices  among 
alternative financial investments and find that groups accumulate significantly  higher expected 
values at a significantly lower total risk. Charness and Karni (2007) study choice monotonicity 
over lottery and bayesian updating by individuals and groups. They find that social interaction 
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reduces violation rates and thus groups make substantially fewer errors than individuals and the 
error rate decreases with group size.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
Each  session  involved  four  parts  plus  a  questionnaire  and  involved  15  participants. 
Overall 120 students participated in the experiment. In part 1, we measured subjects’ risk attitude 
with fifteen  binary choices  between lotteries.  In  part  2 subjects  were randomly divided into 
groups of three persons and faced the same task as in part 1.  We report results of parts 3 and 4, 
which involved a different task, in Casari,  Jackson, and Zhang (2009). The overall  incentive 
structure was similar to that in Holt and Laury (2002). Subjects chose between a “safe” Option A 
and a “risky” Option B. The payoff for Option A was deterministic (50 tokens) and the payoff 
for Option B was either 150 or 0. On the first decision the probability of the high payoff (150) 
for Option B was zero.  In subsequent choices, the probability of the high payoff increased by 
1/20 each line, 0, 1/20, …, 14/20. A risk neutral person would choose option A in lotteries one 
through seven and then switch to option B in lottery eight. Risk seeking agents may switch to 
option B earlier than lottery 7 and risk averse agents may switch later than lottery 7. Any rational 
agent should choose option A over option B in the first lottery (50 vs. 0 francs always) and later 
on eventually switch to option B. Multiple switches would be a signal of confusion. We paid 
only one of the fifteen decisions, chosen randomly at the end of the session. Random choices 
were all implemented through drawings from a bingo cage.
In part two there were five groups in each session. There were a proposal phase, a chat 
phase, and a group choice phase. Everyone simultaneously made an individual proposal about 
each of the fifteen lottery choices.  Then any line with disagreement was highlighted for all three 
group members to see. At this point, participants could switch to a chat window and had two 
minutes to send free-format messages to others in their group. We asked participants to follow 
two basic rules: (1) to be civil to one another and do not use profanities, and (2) not to identify 
themselves in any manner. Messages were recorded. In the chat window subjects received an id 
number from 1 to 3 based on the order in which they sent messages in that specific period. After 
the chat stage, everyone had to submit a choice for the group decision. If the choices of all three 
group members  were identical  for a specific  decision line (unanimity),  then we had a group 
choice. If there was unanimity on all fifteen choices, then part 2 was over. Otherwise, the line(s) 
with disagreement was (were) highlighted and all three group members were asked to submit 
their new proposals. If there was still disagreement, there was another, final round of proposals. 
At this point part 2 was over even if disagreement remained. We paid only one of the fifteen 
5
decisions, chosen randomly at the end of the session. Random choices were all implemented 
through drawings from a bingo cage. If for the line selected the group was still in disagreement, 
then the group earned zero for part 2.
We distributed written instructions and read them aloud, taking questions as they arose. 
The  experiment  was  performed  with  a  z-tree  application  (Fishbacher,  2007).  No  person 
participated in more than one experimental session. We guaranteed a minimum payment of $5. 
We converted each experimental token to an actual dollar at the rate of $0.03. Including all parts, 
a session lasted on average about 2 hours and average earnings per person were about $20.  We 
conducted eight experimental sessions at Purdue University (USA) between September 25 and 
October  28,  2007. Participants  were recruited from the undergraduate  campus population by 
email.
4 Results
We report five main results.
Result 1: The monotonicity of lottery choices improved from the individual to the 
group treatment.
We employed a table format to elicit risk attitude, where a subject with monotonic risk 
preferences would choose option A in decision 1 and then eventually switch forever to option B 
at one later decision. If there were more than one switch from A to B, or if there were switches 
from B back  to  A,  a  subject  is  classified  as  non-monotonic,  which  is  taken  as  a  proxy of 
confusion or irrationality.  Recorded levels of monotonicity in the experiment were very high, 
ranging from 87.5% for individual  choices  (105/120) to 95.0% for group choices  (114/120). 
Only  a  small  portion  of  this  improvement  can  be  attributed  to  task  learning,  as  individual 
proposals  for  group discussion  were  only  slightly  better  than  individual  choices  (90.0% vs. 
87.5%). 
Result 2: Group choices were closer to risk neutrality than individual choices. In 
particular, group choices exhibited a risky shift from individual choices. 
Support for Result 2 comes from Table 2 and Figure 1. We discuss separately lotteries 1-
7 from lotteries 8-15. In lotteries 1-7 only a risk seeking agent would choose the risky option B. 
Differences here were rather limited because risk seeking behavior was rare: on average, only 
2% of individual choices and 0.4% of group choices were for B. In these lotteries, groups were 
more prudent than individuals. Most of the differences  came from lotteries 8-15 where a risk 
neutral agent would choose the risky option B.  In these lotteries, groups were more risky than 
individuals. On average, 57.4% of individual choices and 61.7% of group choices were for B. 
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This difference of 4.3 percentage points may be in part explained by order effects. Part 1 elicited 
individual  choices,  part  2  elicited  individual  proposals  and  group  choices.  About  58.8% of 
individual  proposals  were for B (1.4 points  more  than individual  choices). Order effects  are 
unlikely to explain the risky shift. First, we stated in part one of the instructions that the tasks in 
part one and two were the same lottery choices. Hence subjects could optimize considering the 
overall  level  of uncertainty.  Second,  little  evidence can be traced  from a comparison  of the 
individual choices in part one with the individual proposals in part two. We elicited individual 
proposals  before  any  communication  could  take  place  in  the group  setting  and  report  only 
minimal  differences  with  part  one  choices,  which  helps  to  rule  out  large  order  effects.  As 
mentioned  after  Result  1,  some  of  this  difference  is  simply  correction  of  non-monotonic 
behavior. Third, Masclet et al. (2009) studied order effects but did not find any.
Result 3: When in disagreement, the majority proposal did not always prevail. The 
minority proposal sometimes prevailed, especially when closer to risk neutrality. Confused 
as well as conscientious subjects were more likely to give in to group pressure.
We  focus  explicitly  on  group  decisions  where  there  is disagreement.  We  define 
disagreement  as  a  situation  where  not  all  three  individual  proposals  are  equal.   All  groups 
disagree on at least one decision (Figure 2), 77.5% found an agreement on the first round, 20% 
after a second or third round, and only 2.5% (1 group) never found an agreement.3 On average a 
group disagreed on 4 lottery decisions (27% of decisions). The bulk of the disagreement (85%) 
was  in lotteries 8-13, where risk neutrality pointed toward option B while risk averse subjects 
may have preferred the safer option A (Figure 3). 
The analysis of disagreement is particularly interesting because one can understand the 
internal process that lead to a decision and shed light on Result 2. We consider the 159 group 
decisions with disagreement  out of 600 in order to report patterns of how disagreement was 
resolved  through  group  interaction.  Consider  two  possible  benchmarks:  the  outcome  with  a 
dictator selected at random in the group and the outcome with majority voting. Given that the 
decision was binary, A or B, and a group was consisted of three individuals, there were only two 
possible  patterns  with  disagreement,  a  majority  for  A  (AAB)  or  a  majority  for  B  (ABB). 
Following a random dictator process the majoritarian proposal would prevail in 66.7% of  the 
cases while following majority voting the majoritarian proposal would prevail in 100% of  the 
cases. As Table 3 illustrates, when in disagreement, the majoritarian proposal prevailed in 81.1% 
of the decisions, while the minoritarian proposal prevailed in the remaining 18.9%. Although at 
3 The group reached agreement on 12 of the 15 lottery choices. Analyses with 159 groups (477 proposals) dropped 
those 3 observations while analysis 162 groups (486 proposals) replaced those 3 group lottery choices with the 
individual inputs in the third attempt to reach a group decision. 
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first glance the actual outcome seems in-between a random dictator and a majority rule process, 
looking more closely one can see some interesting biases in group decision making, hence the 
dictator here was not really random. 
The  types  of  decisions  where  the  minoritarian  proposal  prevailed  were  peculiar  and 
generated  a  shift  toward  risk  neutrality  when  aggregating  individual  proposals  into  group 
choices. When in disagreement, 52.7% of individual proposals were the same as those of a risk 
neutral agent. Within the group setting, 57.2% of group decisions had a majority of risk neutral 
proposals  (Table  3).  It  turned  out  that  an  even  larger  fraction  of  group  choices  were  in 
accordance  with risk neutrality (61.0%) because minority proposing risk neutral choices had a 
higher probability of prevailing. Hence the group interaction generated a shift toward more risk 
neutral choices.
Table 4 presents a breakdown with respect to whether the more risky proposal prevailed. 
Overall, with disagreement the more risky proposal prevailed in 54.7% of the decisions, which is 
higher than a coin flip probability and is also higher than the decisions where the majoritarian 
proposal was the more risky (49.7%). Hence, the group interaction does produce a risky shift. In 
particular, when the majority prevailed, in 52.7% of decisions it had the more risky position; 
when the minority prevailed, in 63.3% of decisions it had the more risky position.
Table 5 presents the marginal effect from a probit regression on individual proposals. The 
dependent variable  is equal to one when an individual proposal equals the actual group choice 
(hence it prevails in case of disagreement). Among the independent variables, we included some 
aspects of lottery choices, demographic and personality traits, and chat activity. The focus is on 
individual proposals in disagreement with others in the group. We will postpone the discussion 
of chat activity to Result 4 and discuss the other findings.
The  demographic  variables  are  skill,  gender  and  major.  Skills  are  proxied  by  the 
ACT/SAT scores obtained from the university Registrar’s Office. We have either SAT or ACT 
scores  for 92.5% of the subjects  (missing  data=0),  who are  coded using the US nationwide 
distribution  of  the  SAT-takers  (College  Board  of  Education,  2006)  and  ACT-takers.  The 
threshold for high ability is being in the top quartile of the distribution and for low ability is 
being in the lower quartile. The variables are primarily based on SAT scores and, when missing, 
on ACT scores. The cutoff values are the average between male and female national tables. We 
have interaction terms between gender and skill. 
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Another class of regressors code five personality traits using questionnaire answers. For 
example one variable measures conscientiousness through the average rating on nine statements.4 
Subjects circle a number 1 through 5, where 1 stands for “strongly disagree,” 2 for “disagree,” 3 
for ”neutral,” 4 for “agree,” and 5 for “strongly agree.” The other personality traits coded are 
agreeableness, neuroticism, openness, and extroversion.
Table  5  presents  results  from  the  same  econometric  specification  run  on  five  data 
samples. Column one includes all decisions with disagreement, columns two and three show a 
breakdown of the sample into cases where the majority or minority prevailed, respectively. We 
will later comment on the other columns. The results corroborate five points. First, there was a 
significant shift toward risk neutrality as stated in Result 2.5 Second, as already discussed, being 
in a majority substantially raised the likelihood to prevail in case of group disagreement. Third, 
subjects  who  are  confused  with the  task  are less  likely  to  prevail.  We  proxied  a  subject's 
confusion using a lottery-specific  dummy for her  individual  choice being different  from her 
proposal and a subject-specific dummy for her proposal not being monotonic. Forth, personality 
matters,  in  the  sense  that  more  conscientious  subjects  are  less  likely  to  prevail  in  cases of 
disagreement. Fifth, skill and, to a lower extent gender, affect who prevails in group decision 
making. In particular, there is an adverse selection effect because low skilled subjects are more 
likely  to  prevail  in  cases of  group disagreement.  Smart  females have  also  a  slightly  higher 
influence on group decisions.
Result  4:  About  one  third  of  groups  did  not  find  agreement  immediately  after 
communication. Groups with high skill and monotonic members were more likely to find 
an immediate agreement as well as those with more conscientious and extrovert members. 
Table 6 presents a probit regression on the difficulty of reaching a group agreement in the 
first attempt. Predictably, the higher the number of lotteries with disagreement the less likely the 
groups will resolve disagreement immediately. In addition, both skill and personality measures 
had an impact. Groups with members with SAT/ACT score above the 75th percentile and with 
monotonic  proposals  were  more  likely  to  find  an  immediate  agreement.  Groups  with  more 
conscientious and extrovert members were also more likely to find an immediate agreement. 
There is also a strong effect of Science and Engineering although no gender effect is recorded. 
We will comment on the impact of chat activity in Result 5.
4 I do a thorough job. I do things efficiently. I make plans and follow through. I am a reliable worker. I persevere 
until  the  task  is  finished.  I  am easily  distracted.  I  can  be  somewhat  careless.  I  tend  to  be  lazy.  I  tend  to  be 
disorganized.
5 Table 5B presents an alternative specification to highlight the presence of a risky shift.
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When disagreement persists after the communication stage, group processes may change 
substantially.  In column four of Table 5 we restrict the sample to those groups who required 
multiple  attempts  before  converging  toward  unanimity.  Those  groups  faced  an  emergency 
situation since they would have obtained zero payoffs if they hadn’t reached an agreement after 
three attempts. When disagreement is not resolved immediately, our conclusions at the end of 
Result 3 need qualification. Point one is no longer true, as other factors beyond risk neutrality 
matter  more  in  the  emergency  situation.  Point  four  acquires  a  different  light  as  different 
personality traits prevail: extroversion has now a significant impact while conscientiousness is no 
longer  important.  On  point  five,  the  number  of  observations  is  too  small  to  go  beyond 
conjectures. Women seem to lose their ability to influence group decisions under an emergency.
Result  5:  Chat activity  was intense,  growing with the level  of  disagreement and 
aimed at  finding consensus.  The amount  and timing of  chat  messages  helps  to predict 
group choices.
Every one of the 120 subjects intervened in the two minutes of chat time. On average a 
person intervened 4.3 times and wrote  a total  of  23.9 words. Hence, the average length  of an 
intervention was rather short (5.6 words). Interestingly, the higher the number of decisions with 
disagreement the more intense was the chat activity,  suggesting that messages were aimed at 
finding a common ground. With more disagreements, participants intervened on average about 
the same number of times but with longer messages (Figure 4).
Figure 5 informs about the content of the communication by giving an uncensored list of 
the top 100 words employed. “A” and “B” were the option names and were among the most 
frequently  used.  In  the figure,  the character  size is  proportional  to  frequency of use.  Notice 
numbers 1-15,  whose  sizes  are  roughly  linked  to  how  controversial  that  particular  lottery 
decision was. “I” and “we” suggest the tension between individual and group. Overall, the words 
employed denote a very practical use of communication to reach consensus or express opinions 
for or against a choice.
   The probit regressions in Tables 5 and 6 show that chat activity helps to predict how 
groups resolved disagreement. In Table 5 four variables summarized chat activity: who talked 
first, who talked last, number of words written by the subject and total number of words written 
by the other two people in the group. Even without analyzing the content of the messages, one 
can see three effects on whose choice prevailed in group decision making. First, the persuasion 
effort  as  measured  by the  number  of  words  written  paid  off  in  the  expected  direction.  Not 
voicing  your  own reasons lowered someone's  chances  of determining the group decision.  In 
particular a subject in a minoritarian position had chances to convince the other two if she wrote 
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longer messages. Second, talking first had a small but significant effect on leading the group to 
side for your own proposal. Third, in the subsample with multiple attempts before unanimity 
there was a shift of power towards whom talked last.
In  Table  6  four  other  variables  that  are based on the count  of  the number  of  words 
summarized the chat activity: overall activity in the group, difference in activity between the 
most  and least  active  in  the  group,  length  of  the  last  intervention  and of  the  second-to-last 
intervention. We report two major effects of chat activity on the difficulty  of reaching a group 
agreement in the first attempt. First, groups with more words written in the chat can sort out 
disagreement more quickly. Second, a large inequality in chat activity among group members 
correlates with more difficulties of reaching a consensual group choice.
5 Conclusions
We  study  group  decision  making  with  the  aim  to  understand  how  groups  resolve 
disagreement.  The experimental  task is similar  to previous studies on lottery choices but our 
focus  is  instead  on  the  internal  negotiation  process  of  group  decision  making.  We  present 
evidence both at the aggregate and individual level.
Groups of three participants faced lottery choices and had to find unanimity in order to 
enter a lottery. We kept  a record of group communication and used it in the data analysis. We 
reported that through a group process, lottery choices became more coherent and closer to risk 
neutrality. In resolving disagreement the majority proposal did not always prevail. There were 
some interesting personality and demographic effects.
Our empirical  investigation yielded five main results.  First,  group choices  were more 
coherent than individual choices when measured through the monotonicity over lottery choices. 
Adhering to monotonicity resembles an intellective task and we would expect groups to perform 
better than individuals, as they did. Second, group choices were closer to risk neutrality than 
individual choices. This aggregate result contributes to the debate on whether group decision 
making generates a risky or a prudent shift. Overall, our evidence brings more support in favor of 
group processes producing a shift toward more risky choices. The last three results yield novel 
insights about the black box of group processes. We elicited pre-discussion proposals and post-
discussion  choices  of  group  members  and  analyzed  the  micro-level  data.  The  third  result 
concerns disagreement resolution among group members. The majority proposal did not always 
prevail. The minority proposal sometimes prevailed, especially when it was risk neutral. When 
one group member was able to convince the other two, it often generated a shift toward risk 
neutrality. The fourth result concerns the difficulty of groups in finding an agreement. In fact, 
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about one third of groups did not find an agreement immediately after communication, especially 
those groups with a wider initial disagreement. Lack of agreement caused an emergency situation 
because without unanimity in a lottery choice (either AAA or BBB), participants’ payoff was 
zero for that lottery. Agreement could eventually be reached without further communication in a 
second or third attempt.  In these emergency situations,  the mode of interaction within group 
members changed substantially. Personality traits such as extroversion became more important 
while conscientiousness less important and the effects of skill and gender was also significantly 
altered.
Finally, group members could exchange messages through a chat window. We recorded 
the communication and evaluated its impact on the group outcome. The chat activity was intense, 
growing with the level of disagreement and aimed at finding consensus. The amount and timing 
of chat messages help to predict which choice prevailed in the group. For instance, the number of 
words written by a member is a proxy of her persuasion effort, which paid off in the expected 
direction.  Instead,  the  person  who  talked  last  was  typically  either  a  follower  who  “OKs” 
someone  else’s  proposal  or  a  reluctant  minority  who  threatened  to  blow  up  unanimity  in 
emergency situations.
Understanding group processes in a controlled laboratory environment helps to uncover 
processes and biases of decision-making within firms and complex organizations. Further work 
in this direction promises to uncover additional valuable insights.
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Table 1: Design comparison across five studies of group lottery choices
 
Includes 
between-
subject 
design 
Number of 
groups in 
the 
experiment 
Group 
composition 
across 
choices 
Every 
individual 
posts a  
non-
binding 
proposal 
Default 
choice 
when no 
group 
unanimity 
Maximum  
attempts 
to reach 
group 
choice 
Communication 
Positive 
incentives 
to 
talk/listen 
to others 
Zhang et 
al., 2009 
[This 
study] 
no 40 fixed yes 
None 
(zero 
earnings) 
3 Chat (2 min.) yes/yes 
Masclet 
et al., 
2009 
no 36 random no Random 5 None yes/no 
Shupp 
and 
Williams, 
2007 
yes 28 fixed no 
Mean of 
individual 
bids 
1 Face-to-face (20 min.) yes/no (*) 
Baker et 
al., 2008 yes 40 fixed no 
Majority 
rule 1 Face-to-face 
yes for 
minority/no 
Harrison 
et al., 
2005 
no 36 fixed no Majority rule 1 None 
yes for 
minority/no 
 
Notes: (*) It may be “yes/yes,” a short explanation follows. Shupp and Williams (2007) asked to price each lottery  
and then awarded the lottery using an incentive compatible mechanism. The default bid without unanimity is the  
average of individual bids. Notice that an individual player may have an incentive to manipulate the group price by  
strategically over- or under-bidding in order to generate a group bid closer to her preferred level
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Table 2: Lottery choice task
 Option A
Option
 B Risk Preference
Individual 
Choices
Individual  
Proposals
Group 
Choices
Decision 
node Payoffs Payoffs
Probability 
of getting 
150 tokens
Expected 
payoff of 
option B
Range of CRRA 
If switch from A 
to B at the fol-
lowing decision 
node
Frequency 
of choices 
for B
Frequency 
of choices 
for B
Frequency 
of choices 
for B
(%) (%) (%)
1 50
150 or 
0 0 0 r<-1.73 0 0.8 0
2 50
150 or 
0 0.05 7.5 -1.73<r<-1.1 0 0 0
3 50
150 or 
0 0.1 15 -1.1<r<-0.73 1.7 0 0
4 50
150 or 
0 0.15 22.5 -0.73<r<-0.47 0 0 0
5 50
150 or 
0 0.2 30 -0.47<r<-0.27 1.7 0 0
6 50
150 or 
0 0.25 37.5 -0.27<r<-0.1 5 2.5 0
7 50
150 or 
0 0.3 45 -0.1<r<0.04 5.8 6.7 2.5
8 50
150 or 
0 0.35 52.5 0.04<r<0.16 15 20 16.7
9 50
150 or 
0 0.4 60 0.16<r<0.27 24.2 26.7 21.7
10 50
150 or 
0 0.45 67.5 0.27<r<0.36 31.7 32.5 36.7
11 50
150 or 
0 0.5 75 0.36<r<0.45 58.3 58.3 65
12 50
150 or 
0 0.55 82.5 0.45<r<0.53 68.3 67.5 80
13 50
150 or 
0 0.6 90 0.53<r<0.6 80 80 87.5
14 50
150 or 
0 0.65 97.5 0.6<r<0.66 88.3 90.8 95
15 50
150 or 
0 0.7 105 0.66<r 93.3 95 97.5
  Percentage of monotonic decision makers 87.5 90 95
Notes: Everyone should choose option A in decision 1. Risk neutral subjects would switch to option B in decision 8.  
A switch in later decisions reveals risk aversion and a switch in earlier decisions reveals risk seeking behavior.  
Number of observations for each line: 120.
16
Table 3: Risk neutrality when disagreement           Table 4: Risky shift when disagreement
Majority 
prevailed
Minority 
prevailed
Majority 
prevailed
Minority 
prevailed
Majority at risk 
neutrality 79 12
91
(57.2%)
Majority more 
risky 68 11
79
(49.7%)
Minority at risk 
neutrality 50 18
68
(42.8%)
Minority more 
risky 61 19
80
(50.3%)
Totals 129(81.1%)
30
(18.9%)
159
(100%) Totals 129 30 159
Notes: Group decisions with disagreement only (27.0% of total). The table compares individual proposals with 
group choice. The majority proposal was A when AAB and was B when ABB.
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Table 5: Probit regression on how groups resolve disagreement (main)
Sample: decisions with disagreement only
Dependent variable:
1= my proposal equals group choice, 0= otherwise
All
(1)
Majority 
prevails
(2)
Minority 
prevails
(3)
Multiple at-
tempts be-
fore unanim-
ity
(4)
One at-
tempt be-
fore unan-
imity
(5)
Independent variables:
My proposal was the risk neutral choice (1 or 0) 0.20* 0.15* 0.15* 0.06 0.33**
(0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12)
My proposal was in the majority (1 or 0) 0.65** 0.72** 0.64**
(0.08) (0.16) (0.11)
My individual choice was different than my proposal -0.27* -0.38* 0.07 -0.37** -0.36*
(0.13) (0.18) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15)
My proposals were not monotonic (1 or 0) -0.30** -0.18 -0.08 -0.13 -0.33**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.04) (0.12) (0.12)
Number of lottery decisions on which the group dis-
agree
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
Multiple attempts to decide (1 or 0) 0.05 0.04 -0.07
(0.05) (0.03) (0.07)
Chat messages
I talked first (1 or 0) 0.09 0.09** 0.12 -0.08 0.00
(0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08)
I talked last (1 or 0) -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.20* -0.13
(0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08)
Number of words I wrote in my group (x 100) 0.15 -0.23 0.53* 0.82 0.23
(0.46) (0.18) (0.21) (0.58) (0.59)
Number of words that all other members wrote (x 100) -0.40 -0.38** 0.17 -0.46** -0.36
(0.24) (0.10) (0.17) (0.14) (0.32)
Demographics
Science and Engineering Major (1 or 0) 0.08 0.06 -0.05 0.20 0.04
(0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09)
Male who is above 75 percentile SAT/ACT (1 or 0) 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.17**
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.21) (0.06)
Female who is above 75 percentile SAT/ACT (1 or 0) 0.11 0.08** -0.02 -0.21 0.29**
(0.12) (0.03) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09)
Male who is below 25 percentile SAT/ACT (1 or 0) 0.08 0.08** 0.12 0.15* 0.10
(0.09) (0.02) (0.14) (0.07) (0.11)
Female who is below 25 percentile SAT/ACT (1 or 0) 0.12 0.07* 0.02 -0.36* 0.33**
(0.11) (0.03) (0.13) (0.17) (0.05)
Missing demographic data (1 or 0) 0.09 0.06 -0.03 -0.46 0.19*
(0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.30) (0.09)
Personality traits
Agreeableness 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.06
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06)
Conscientiousness -0.11 -0.09** -0.01 0.15 -0.13
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09)
Neuroticism -0.01 -0.04 -0.00 0.12 -0.05
(0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.18) (0.07)
Openness 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.04
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06)
Extroversion -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.15* -0.03
(0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
Number of observations 477 318 159 150 327
Pseudo R-squared -204.5 -109.0 -61.17 -49.06 -137.3
Log likelihood 0.362 0.292 0.206 0.507 0.378
Notes: marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clusters on groups. 
Statistical significance ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Sample: decisions with disagreement only. The regression includes  
lottery decision dummies, which have not been reported in the table. One group did not agree on 3 lottery decisions  
and those decisions are excluded from this table.
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Table 6: Probit regression on group difficulty of reaching an agreement
Sample: decisions with disagreement only
Dependent variable: 
1= my group required more than one attempt to decide; 0= otherwise
Independent variables:
my proposal was the risk neutral choice (0/1) 0.00
(0.05)
my individual choice was different than my proposal 0.05
(0.11)
my proposals were not monotonic (0/1) 0.36**
(0.16)
number of lotteries with disagreement in the group 0.17***
(0.05)
number of words written overall by group (x 100) -0.52*
(0.30)
number of words written in the last intervention (x 100) 0.01
(0.02)
number of words written in the second to last intervention (x 100) 0.04***
(0.01)
difference in words spoken between the most and the least individual in a group (x 
100) 1.22**
(0.59)
Science and Engineering Major -0.25**
(0.11)
MALE who is above 75 percentile SAT/ACT -0.20**
(0.08)
FEMALE who is above 75 percentile SAT/ACT -0.12*
(0.07)
MALE who is below 25 percentile SAT/ACT 0.05
(0.14)
FEMALE who is below 25 percentile SAT/ACT -0.01
(0.13)
Missing data 0.05
(0.12)
agreeableness -0.02
(0.06)
conscientiousness -0.17**
(0.08)
neuroticism 0.01
(0.07)
openness -0.12
(0.08)
extroversion -0.14**
(0.07)
Observations 477
Pseudo R-squared 0.519
Log likelihood -142.8
Notes: marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clusters on groups. 
Statistical significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: decisions with disagreement only.
The regression includes lottery decision dummies, which have not been reported in the table. 
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Figure 1: Individual versus Group risk attitude. 
Fraction of risky lottery choices by groups and individuals
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Figure 2: Group classification by number of decisions in disagreement (N=40)
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Figure 3: Which lottery decisions were most controversial.
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Figure 4: Chat activity (N=40)
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Figure 5: One hundred most frequent words in chat messages
Notes: “B” is the most frequently used (122 times) “DECISION” is the least used (7 times). Character size is  
proportional to frequency of use
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[For the referee only] Table 5B: How groups resolve disagreement (robustness check)
Dependent variable: 
1= my  proposal equals group choice, 0= otherwise
All
(1)
Majority 
prevails
(2)
Minority 
prevails
(3)
Multiple 
attempts 
before un-
animity
(4)
One at-
tempt be-
fore unan-
imity
(5)
Independent variables:
My proposal was more risky than the alternative choice 
(1 or 0)
0.16 0.13** 0.14* 0.05 0.26*
(0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.12)
My proposal was in the majority (1 or 0) 0.67** 0.73** 0.65**
(0.08) (0.15) (0.11)
My individual choice was different than my proposal -0.27* -0.38* 0.07 -0.35** -0.36*
(0.13) (0.18) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15)
My proposals were not monotonic (1 or 0) -0.31** -0.17 -0.08 -0.15 -0.33**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10) (0.12)
Number of lottery decisions on which the group disagree -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.04 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
Multiple attempts to decide (1 or 0) 0.04 0.04 -0.07
(0.05) (0.03) (0.07)
Chat messages
I talked first (1 or 0) 0.08 0.09** 0.12 -0.09 0.00
(0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
I talked last (1 or 0) -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.20* -0.14
(0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08)
Number of words I wrote in my group (x 100) 0.12 -0.23 0.53* 0.85 0.19
(0.45) (0.18) (0.21) (0.55) (0.55)
Number of words that all other members wrote (x 100) -0.39 -0.36** 0.17 -0.48** -0.36
(0.24) (0.09) (0.17) (0.12) (0.31)
Demographics
Science and Engineering Major (1 or 0) 0.07 0.06 -0.05 0.19* 0.03
(0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Male who is above 75 percentile SAT/ACT (1 or 0) 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.15**
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.26) (0.06)
Female who is above 75 percentile SAT/ACT (1 or 0) 0.09 0.07** -0.02 -0.22 0.27**
(0.12) (0.03) (0.12) (0.20) (0.10)
Male who is below 25 percentile SAT/ACT (1 or 0) 0.08 0.08** 0.12 0.15 0.10
(0.08) (0.02) (0.14) (0.09) (0.11)
Female who is below 25 percentile SAT/ACT (1 or 0) 0.12 0.07* 0.02 -0.36* 0.32**
(0.10) (0.03) (0.13) (0.17) (0.05)
Missing demographic data (1 or 0) 0.10 0.06 -0.03 -0.46 0.20*
(0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.27) (0.09)
Personality traits
Agreeableness 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06)
Conscientiousness -0.11 -0.09** -0.01 0.13 -0.12
(0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09)
Neuroticism -0.01 -0.04 -0.00 0.13 -0.04
(0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.15) (0.07)
Openness 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.03
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
Extroversion -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.14 -0.04
(0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
Number of observations 477 318 159 150 327
Pseudo R-squared 0.354 0.292 0.206 0.507 0.357
Log likelihood -207.1 -109.0 -61.17 -49.10 -141.9
Notes: see notes to Table 5. This regression includes “My proposal was more risky than the alternative choice” in 
alternative to “My proposal was the risk neutral choice” as they are highly correlated.
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Not for publication
COPY OF THE INSTRUCTIONS [EXCTRACT]
This experiment deals with the economics of decision making under uncertainty.  Various agencies have 
provided funds for  the experiment.   If  you  follow these instructions  and make good decisions,  you  can earn a 
significant amount of money, which you will receive in cash, privately at the end of the experiment.
Earnings are in tokens, each token is worth $0.03. You are guaranteed a minimum payment of $5 but will 
most likely earn more. The experiment is divided into four parts. You will be paid the sum of your earnings from all 
parts. The table below will help you to keep track of your earnings. 
  EARNINGS TABLE
Part 1 ______________
Part 2 ______________
Part 3 ______________
Part 4 ______________
Total in tokens ______________
Total in dollars (conversion rate 1 token=$0.03) ______________
The tasks in part 1 and part 2 are identical.  We are now reading the instructions for part 1.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1
Please look at the table in the next page. For each decision, state whether you prefer option A or option B.  
Your earnings depend on which option you choose: if you choose option A, you will receive 50 tokens for sure. If 
you choose option B, you will receive either 150 tokens or 0 tokens depending on the results of a random 
draw. 
Notice that there are a total of 15 decisions but just one decision in the table will be randomly selected 
for payment. When you make your choices, you don’t know which decision will be paid. Hence you should pay 
attention to every decision.  At the end of the session, we will randomly draw a number from 1 to 15 to select a 
decision. Each number is equally likely. 
In the decision selected for payment, you may have chosen either option A or B. If you chose A, you will 
receive 50 tokens. If you chose B, we will do a second random draw. Every number from 1 to 20 is equally likely. 
This second number is then compared with the numbers for option B in the table. If the number shows up in the left 
column of the decision selected you earn 150 tokens. If the number shows up in the right column you earn 0 tokens.
We ask you to make the choices on paper and then to input them into the computer as well. 
Now it is time for clarifications. Are there any questions?
Before proceeding we ask that you complete a short quiz below.
Quiz
1. If at the end of the experiment, we first draw number 2 and then we draw number 1, what are your 
earnings?
In case my choice for decision 2 was A ______________tokens
In case my choice for decision 2 was B ______________tokens
2. If at the end of the experiment, we first draw number 14 and then we draw number 14 again what are your 
earnings?
In case my choice for decision 14 was A ______________tokens
In case my choice for decision 14 was B ______________tokens
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Participant ID:  Part 1 (individual)
Decisi
on no.
Option A Option
B
                       (left column)                                                     (right column)
Please 
choose A 
or B
1  50 tokens 150 tokens   never 0 tokens   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,
    16,17,18,19,20
2  50 tokens 150 tokens if 1 comes out of the bingo cage 0 tokens   if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,
    16,17,18,19,20
3  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1 and 2 0 tokens   if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,
    16,17,18,19,20
4  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2 and 3 0 tokens   if 
    4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
5  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2,3,4 0 tokens   if 
    5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
6  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2,3,4,5 0 tokens   if 
    6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
7  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2,3,4,5,6 0 tokens   if 
    7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
8  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 0 tokens   if 
    8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
9  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 0 tokens   if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
10  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 0 tokens   if 10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
11  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 0 tokens   if 11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
12  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 0 tokens   if 12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
13  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 0 tokens   if 13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
14  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 0 tokens   if 14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
15  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 0 tokens   if 15, 16,17,18,19,20
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2
You will now face the same decisions as in part 1, but this time you will be in a group with two other 
participants.
On the first screen, you will input your proposals for the 15 decisions for others in your group to see on 
their screens. When you click “Submit,” all proposals of your group members will be posted on the screen for you to 
see. From the screen you will see if your group members made the same or different proposals.
At this point, you will be able to send messages to people in your group. To see how, please click now on 
the messenger tab in the lower portion of your screen. The messenger window will open. Then click on the lower 
(white) part of the box and type “hello”. Please everyone type “hello” now. Then click the ‘Send’ button, so that 
others in your group can read your message. If you look at the messenger window you will see how many seconds 
remain for exchanging messages. The messenger window will be active for two minutes during the task when you 
start to make decisions for money. Now please switch to the main window by clicking on the background.
Although we will record the messages your group sends to each other, only the people in your group will 
see them. In  sending messages,  you  should follow two basic rules:  (1) Be civil to one another  and do not use 
profanities, and (2) Do not identify yourself in any manner. The communication channel is intended to discuss your 
choices and should be used that way.
Remember to click the ‘Send’ button after typing your message. This is VERY important. If you do not 
click the “Send” button, then your message will not be sent. Therefore, ALWAYS click on the “Send” button after 
typing in your messages. Also, it is very important that you do not close any window at any time because that will 
cause  delays  and problems with the software.  If  you  like,  you  can  simply wait  without  sending any message, 
although the messages may help you to agree on a common choice for the group. 
After the exchange of messages, you will make your final choices of A or B for the group and then press 
the ‘Submit’ button. Your earnings depend on which options you choose and on new random draws. The procedure 
for payment is the same as in the previous task. Just one decision in the table will be randomly selected for payment 
at the end of the session. 
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If  all  three  people  in  the  group made  the  same choice  in  all  decisions,  those  will  be  the  group 
decisions. If some choices are different, you will be able to revise them in a second round. If some of the choices are 
still different after the second round, you will be able to revise again the choice in a third round. 
If the group does not reach unanimity by the third round, the group may lose the opportunity to earn tokens. 
More precisely, if a decision with disagreement is randomly selected for payment, the group will always earn zero.
At the very end of part 2, remember to record the final group decisions in the table on the next page. For each 
decision, state whether the group agreed on option A, option B, or whether there was still disagreement by the third 
round. 
Now it is time for clarifications. Are there any questions?
Participant ID:         Part 2 (group)
Decisi
on no.
Option A Option
B
 (left column)                                                     (right column)
FINAL GROUP 
DECISION
Please choose 
A, B, or 
disagreement
1  50 tokens 150 tokens   never 0 tokens   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,
    16,17,18,19,20
2  50 tokens 150 tokens if 1 comes out of the bingo cage 0 tokens   if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,
    16,17,18,19,20
3  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1 and 2 0 tokens   if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,
    16,17,18,19,20
4  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2 and 3 0 tokens   if 
    4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
5  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2,3,4 0 tokens   if 
    5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
6  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2,3,4,5 0 tokens   if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
7  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2,3,4,5,6 0 tokens   if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
8  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 0 tokens   if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
9  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 0 tokens   if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
10  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 0 tokens   if 10,11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
11  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 0 tokens   if 11,12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
12  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 0 tokens   if 12,13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
13  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 0 tokens   if 13,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
14  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 0 tokens   if 14,15, 16,17,18,19,20
15  50 tokens 150 tokens   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 0 tokens   if 15, 16,17,18,19,20
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